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Abstract
Economic theory suggests both positive and negative relationships between intra-
ﬁrm wage inequality and productivity. This paper contributes to the growing empirical
literature on this subject. We combine German employer-employee-data for the years
1995-2005 with inequality measures using the whole wage distribution of a ﬁrm and
rely on dynamic panel-data estimators to control for unobserved heterogeneity, simul-
taneity problems and possible state dependence. Our results indicate a relative minor
inﬂuence of intra-ﬁrm wage inequality on ﬁrm productivity. If anything, they provide
some support for a view suggesting that some inequality may be beneﬁcial, while too
much leads to a detrimental eﬀect on productivity.
Keywords: Wage dispersion, labor productivity
JEL Classiﬁcation: J31, M52
∗Empirical Economics, Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lueneburg, braak-
mann@uni.leuphana.de, Tel.: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2303, Fax: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2026
The author would like to thank Joachim Wagner for helpful hints and overall support and the crew of
the research data center of the Federal Employment Agency in the Institute for Employment Reserach
at Nuremberg for helpful discussions and hospitality. All calculations were performed using Stata 9.2 SE
(StataCorp 2005). All do-ﬁles are available from the author on request. The data used in this paper is
conﬁdential but can be accessed through the research data center of the Federal Employment Agency in
the Institute of Employment Research, see http://fdz.iab.de for further information.
11 Introduction
Economic theory suggests several possible relationships between intra-ﬁrm wage inequality
and labor productivity. On the one hand, tournament theory and related approaches
argue that a high wage spread implies high gains associated with promotions for highly
productive workers. On the other hand, several theories point towards a negative eﬀect of
a wage spread that becomes too large.
The ﬁrst group of arguments is related to eﬃciency wage theory. If a ﬁrm rewards
relative performance, workers are rewarded based on a comparison with their peers. Since
wage increases or promotions are awarded only to the very best, workers have an incentive
to work as hard as possible. High wage dispersion in that scenario implies high wage gains
for the top-performers and should consequently be associated with higher productivity.
A positive relationship between wage inequality and labor productivity may also be
expected if a ﬁrm chooses a performance related pay scheme that rewards absolute perfor-
mance, e.g. piece-rates, and workers are heterogeneous with respect to their ability (see
Lazear 1996, 2000 for a case study and theoretical discussion). Performance related pay
should create an incentive for workers to work harder thus leading to a rise in average pro-
ductivity. These incentives are stronger for high-ability workers who ﬁnd it easier to raise
their individual output levels than their low-ability counterparts. Since these diﬀerences
in individual output directly map into diﬀerences in pay under a performance pay scheme,
wage dispersion may be expected to rise.
While these theoretical ideas suggest a positive relationship between wage inequality
and worker performance, others point at a diﬀerent direction. Lazear (1989) argues that
high wage gains in tournaments not only create incentives to work harder, but might also
2induce workers to sabotage the work of other members of their respective comparison
group. Greater pay equality within these reference groups makes this deviant behavior less
worthwhile thus reducing the eﬃciency losses.
A similar argument relates to rent-seeking by workers (see Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and
Roberts 1990). Instead of conducting productive work, workers may choose to allocate more
time to unproductive rent-seeking, e.g. trying to convince their supervisors to change the
wage structure in their favor. The incentive to engage in these redistributive activities is
clearly larger if the wage spread is large. A simple remedy for a ﬁrm faced with this problem
is to compress the wage structure thus reducing the potential gains from rent-seeking.
Frey (1997) argues that monetary rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation of work-
ers. If a ﬁrm raises wage inequality to create incentives for workers to become more pro-
ductive, this crowding-out might work in the opposite direction thus leading to a smaller,
if not negative eﬀect on labor productivity.
Finally, another strand of the literature focuses on aspects of fairness or cohesion be-
tween workers. Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) derive a variation of eﬃciency wage theory
based on “fair” wages. In their model, workers do not only care about their absolute wage
but base their eﬀort on a comparison between their actual wage and a wage they consider
fair. This fair wage is in turn inﬂuenced by the wages of a comparison group, e.g. similar
workers in the same ﬁrm. In this model, greater wage compression may lead to higher
productivity by means of a wage structure that places more workers close to their fair
wage.
A similar argument is used by Levine (1991) who considers the importance of cohesion
between workers in certain work environments. His arguments suggest that when cohesion
3is important, e.g. in ﬁrms that rely heavily on group work, a certain amount of wage
compression will be beneﬁcial as it raises overall productivity.
Empirically, the direction of the relationship between wage dispersion and labor pro-
ductivity remains unanswered. A number of studies, reviewed in greater detail in section 2,
have dealt with this question without reaching a deﬁnite consensus. Studies using evidence
from professional sports usually ﬁnd either a negative or insigniﬁcant relationship between
wage inequality and productivity, while studies focusing on executive compensation or ﬁrm
level inequality reach somewhat diﬀerent conclusions.
This paper contributes to the literature by combining for the ﬁrst time ﬁrm-level panel
data and inequality measures built on the entire wage distribution within ﬁrms with an
estimation strategy that accounts for endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and possible
dynamics in the adjustment process of ﬁrm productivity to changes in the wage structure.
More speciﬁcally, we use linked-employer-employee data from Germany for the years 1995
to 2005 to estimate the relationship between several measures of wage inequality and aver-
age productivity. To account for endogeneity and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity,
we use dynamic Arellano-Bond panel-data estimators that also allow for possible state
dependence in productivity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of previous
evidence from empirical studies. Section 3 describes the data used in this study while
section 4 outlines our estimation strategy along with the estimator used. Results are
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
42 Previous evidence
Much of the previous econometric evidence relating wage inequality to the economic per-
formance of organizations comes from either professional sports (e.g. Bloom 1999, Depken
2000, DeBrock et al. 2004, Frick et al. 2003, Harder 1992), executive compensation (e.g.
Eriksson 1999, Leonhard 1990, Main et al. 1993) or from other special environments (see
e.g. Pfeﬀer, Langton 1993 for college and university faculty). The results are generally
mixed between as well as within these strands of the literature. A slight majority of the
“sports papers” reports a detrimental eﬀect of wage inequality, while the papers concerned
with executives are more in favor of a positive relationship between performance and wage
dispersion. One should note, however, that none of these results generalizes easily to the
whole population of workers in a ﬁrm and the question what eﬀects inequality in their
wages might have on a ﬁrm’s performance.
In recent years a small, but growing numbers of papers, summarized in table 1, has
used either ﬁrm or linked employer-employee-data to investigate the relationship between
pay inequality among workers and ﬁrm performance. Cowherd and Levine (1992) use
data on 102 business units from the UK and the USA. They use two measures of wage
inequality, speciﬁcally lower management wages compared to those of hourly paid workers
and lower compared to upper management wages, and relate those to a measure of product
quality. Results from standard linear regressions reveal a negative relationship between
these variables.
(Table 1 about here.)
In a study for Austria, Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller use data from Social Security.
The data encompasses all workers from 130 ﬁrms between 1975 and 1991. They construct a
5measure of conditional wage inequality that takes into account the wage diﬀerences justiﬁed
by diﬀerent compositions of the workforce. More speciﬁcally, they estimate ﬁrm- and year-
speciﬁc standard wage regressions and use the variance of the residuals as a measure of
wage inequality. Since their data does not contain a measure of ﬁrm performance, they
rely on the results from the wage regression to calculate standardized wages for typical
workers as a proxy for productivity. Their results from group-mean regressions show a non
monotonic relationship for white-collar-workers where productivity increases with rising
wage inequality at low levels and decreases if inequality becomes to large. For blue-collar
workers the same overall relationship emerges. However, here most observations are to the
left of the turning point, thus implying a positive, though decreasing relationship between
wage inequality and productivity.
Using aggregate data from Sweden for the years 1964-1993 for industries and 1972-1993
for plants to estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas-function, Hibbs and Locking (2000) ﬁnd
a positive association between wage inequality and ﬁrm performance, measured as value
added and value added per worker. They also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of between-industry
wage inequality on aggregate output and productivity growth.
In a paper for Denmark, Bingley and Eriksson (2001) use linked employer-employee
data from integrated database for labour market research (IDA) and the business statistics
database (BSD). Their data contains the population of Danish ﬁrms that have at least
ﬁve managers, ﬁve other white-collar workers and ﬁve blue-collar workers, as well as in-
formation on all their employees for the years 1992 to 1995, resulting in 22,665 ﬁrm-year
observations. They measure productivity and worker eﬀort on the ﬁrm level by using total
factor productivity and sickness absence respectively. These are regressed on a measure
of wage dispersion similar to that used by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999), that is
6residuals from a wage regressions, here calculated using all workers in the sample. Regard-
ing the eﬀects of pay inequality on productivity, their results for white-collar workers show
the same non-monotonic relationship as found by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999),
while no eﬀect can be found for blue-collar worker wage inequality. For both blue- and
white-collar workers a higher pay spread is associated with reduced sickness absence and
thus higher eﬀort.
Using ﬁrm-level data from the UK, Beaumont and Harris (2003) look at the relationship
between wage dispersion, measured as the ratio of manual to non-manual labor, and gross
value added per worker. They estimate Cobb-Douglas-type production functions for several
industries using Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimators to account for the endogeneity
of labor productivity, employment, capital stock and relative wages. Their results show
positive eﬀects of their measure of wage dispersion for most industries, more speciﬁcally
electronic data processing, motor vehicles and engines, aerospace and miscellaneous foods,
and a negative eﬀect in one industry (pharmaceutics).
In another paper trying to account for the endogeneity of wage dispersion, Lallemand
et al. (2004) use cross-sectional linked-employer-employee data from the Belgian 1995
Structure of Earnings Survey and the 1995 Structure of Business Survey. Their sample en-
compasses 17,490 individuals working for 397 ﬁrms from the private sector with at least 200
employees. They construct a conditional wage dispersion measure by using the same ap-
proach as Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) and use it alongside several unconditional
dispersion indicators in regressions on gross operating surplus per worker. As wage disper-
sion measures may be rendered endogenous by bonus payments, they instrument overall
wage dispersion by the dispersion of wages excluding bonus payments in a 2SLS-equation.
Their results show a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between wage inequality and ﬁrm
7performance which is larger for blue-collar workers.
Grund and Westergard-Nielsen (2004) look at both the dispersion of wages and wage
increases using Danish linked employer-employee data for ﬁrms with at least 20 employees
for the years 1992 to 1997. Their ﬁndings indicate a hump-shaped relationship between
wage dispersion and log value added that disappears when controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. The dispersion of wage growth is found to have a U-shaped inﬂuence,
with most of the ﬁrms in the sample being situated on the decreasing part of that curve.
Also using linked employer-employee data for 1991 and 1995 from several Swedish
data sources, Heyman (2005) estimates the relationship between several measures of wage
dispersion among managers and white-collar employees and a variety of performance mea-
sures. He accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity of wage
dispersion by estimating ﬁrst diﬀerences from 1991 to 1995 and instrumenting the 1995
wage dispersion with their 1991 counterpart. His ﬁndings indicate a positive impact of
both managerial and white-collar wage inequality on proﬁts and average pay and a posi-
tive relationship between managerial wage inequality and variation in sales.
Finally, Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) use ﬁrm-level data from Germany to look into the
interaction between (blue-collar) wage inequality, measured as the diﬀerence between the
highest wage for a skilled worker and the lowest wage of an unskilled worker in the same
establishment, pay and promotions schemes, collective bargaining, work councils and their
impact on ﬁrm performance. While they cannot control for either unobserved heterogeneity
or the potential endogeneity of wage dispersion, their results indicate that the eﬀect of wage
dispersion diﬀers greatly when taking the aforementioned interactions into account.
Taken together, the evidence suggests an either positive or hump-shaped relationship
8between wage inequality and ﬁrm performance. This relationship seems to be relatively
robust to the exact deﬁnition of wage inequality and the performance measure used. It
also seems somewhat stable over countries and time periods with the insigniﬁcant German
results from Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) being an exception.
3 Data
This paper uses the linked employer-employee data of the Institute for Employment Re-
search in Nuremberg, the so-called LIAB.1 The LIAB is created by merging establishment
information from the IAB Establishment Panel, a representative survey conducted annu-
ally since 1993, with employee information from notiﬁcations to German social security.
This paper uses the cross-sectional version of the LIAB, currently available for the years
1993 to 2005, where the panel data on establishments is merged with cross-sectional in-
formation on all employees working in the respective establishment on July 30th of each
year. Note that this results in an annual panel at the ﬁrm level.
The employee data originates from Social security information and is collected in the
so called employee history by the Federal Employment Agency.2 Employers are obliged
to deliver annual information on their employees to social security by German law which
is used for pension, health and unemployment insurance. The resulting data contains
information on the begin and end of employment, daily wages, a person’s age and sex, as
well as several variables collected for statistical purposes, e.g. education.
This data is combined with ﬁrm level data from the IAB Establishment Panel by a
1For a short introduction see Alda et al. (2005), detailed information (in German) in available in Ja-
cobebbinghaus and Alda (2007) and on the website of the Research Data Center of the Federal Employment
Agency in the Institute for Employment Research http://fdz.iab.de.
2More information on person-level data from German social security records can be found in Bender at
al. (2000).
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lishment Panel is conducted annually since 1993 in West Germany, with East Germany
joining in 1996.3 It is representative for all German ﬁrms with at least one worker covered
by social security. Case numbers vary between approximately 4.000 and 16.000 cases per
year. The resulting panel is unbalanced, though response rates are usually around 80%
for plants that are interviewed repeatedly (Alda et al. 2005, p. 331). The data con-
tains detailed annual information on the employee structure, industrial relations, economic
conditions, establishment size, etc., as well as special surveys varying by year. 4
To contruct the estimation sample used in this paper, we take the following steps. In a
ﬁrst step, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms situated in West Germany. First, East German
workers born in the Socialist German Democratic Republic might have perceptions of
fairness or attitudes towards wage inequality that are fundamentally diﬀerent from West
German workers. Consequently we cannot expect the relationship between wage dispersion
and labor productivity to be same in these two regions. Secondly, during the time period
considered in this paper, the transformation process after the German reuniﬁcation might
still be in progress in East Germany, making the regions not fully comparable.
Since any measure of wage inequality is not particularly meaningful in very small ﬁrms,
we restrict the sample to ﬁrms with ﬁve or more workers in at least one year. Additionally,
as information on collective bargaining is only available from 1995 onwards, we restrict the
sample to the years 1995 to 2005. Finally, to avoid problems with outliers, establishments
with outcome measures in the top and bottom 1% are dropped, leaving us with ca. 21,000
3Detailed information on the IAB Establishment Panel (up to the year 2000) can be found in Kölling
(2000).
4See Alda et al. 2005 for a short overview on the annual topics, a complete list of all items as well as
complete questionaires and additional information can be found on the website of the on the website of
the Research Data Center of the Federal Employment Agency in the Institute for Employment Research
http://fdz.iab.de.
10ﬁrm-year-observation from 6,000 ﬁrms, the exact number depending on the speciﬁcation
and the estimator used.
When measuring wage inequality, it is useful to distinguish between two diﬀerent con-
cepts: overall wage inequality without taking diﬀerences in the composition of the work-
force into account and inequality in comparable subgroups, e.g. between workers with
similar characteristics. Depending on the exact nature of the data-generating process,
both concepts might be relevant for labor productivity.
Consider ﬁrst the case of tournament theories where a greater wage inequality may be
taken as a sign for larger incentives associated with high performance. In that scenario,
overall wage inequality might be relevant if workers believe that each wage level in a
ﬁrm can actually be reached by high performance. Wage inequality within certain groups
would better reﬂect the fact that most often workers will compete against similar peers for
a promotion.
A similar argument holds for the fairness theories. Overall wage inequality would reﬂect
workers sentiments towards the overall wage spread in a ﬁrm, e.g. the belief that upper
management should only earn a certain multiple of the average blue-collar worker wage.
Wage inequality between similar workers comes closer to the intuitive notion of fairness,
speciﬁcally that an allocation is more unfair if equal workers are treated unequally.
In this paper, we use variants of both concepts of wage inequality. In a ﬁrst step,
wages above the social security contribution threshold are imputed by means of a Tobit-
based imputation procedure (Gartner 2005) using standard wage regression variables as
sex, age, education, occupational position, regions and industry. In a second step, the
overall wage inequality is measured by the coeﬃcient of variation using all wages from a
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of variation calculated for subgroups deﬁned by age, occupational positions and education
(ﬁve categories each), where the weights are the number of people in each subgroup.
To create a third measure of inequality, we rely on an approach similar to the one
used by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999): We estimate year-speciﬁc wage equations
by Tobit-regressions to account for the top-censoring of the wage variable using the same
variables as in the imputation described above. Inequality is then measured by the standard
deviation of residuals for all persons in a given ﬁrm.
Labor productivity is approximated using (log) sales per worker (in Euro). Further-
more, we control for the structure of the workforce using the share of qualiﬁed workers
(both blue and white collar) and the share of women, information on collective bargaining
agreements and ﬁrm size. Unfortunately, the data does not contain information on a ﬁrm’s
capital stock thus preventing the use of production functions.
(Table 2 about here.)
Table 2 displays descriptive information on some key variables. Note that the high share
of qualiﬁed workers is not uncommon in Germany where most workers have completed
vocational training. The high number of ﬁrms covered by collective bargaining agreements
at he industry level and the much lower number of ﬁrms with individual agreements is also
typical for industrial relations in Germany.
124 Econometric modeling
Consider the following data-generating process
yit = γyit−1 + βXit + τDit + ηi + it, (1)
where yit is log sales per worker, γ captures state dependence of the dependent variable,
Xit contains time-varying control variables, Dit is a matrix containing measures of wage
inequality, ηi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect and it an error term.
Equation (1) is used to estimate four models, each using diﬀerent measures of inequal-
ity: Model I uses both the overall and the average within-group coeﬃcient of variation. τ
in this model measures the impact of changing one type of inequality while holding the
other constant. Models II and III use only the overall or the average within-group coef-
ﬁcient of variation respectively, giving rise to unconditional estimates for each inequality
measure. Finally, model IV uses the residual variation measure that controls for diﬀerences
in workforce composition.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect ηi captures the fact that both wage dispersion as well
as labor productivity may be inﬂuenced by time-invariant unobserved factors, e.g. ﬁrm
“culture”. It also captures the impact of all time invariant variables, like industry aﬃliation,
that might also inﬂuence productivity. The presence of these ﬁxed eﬀects implies that
identiﬁcation of all parameters uses variation over time within ﬁrms.
The state dependence parameter γ allows for the inﬂuence of past on present produc-
tivity. Many factors that inﬂuenced productivity in the last period, e.g. motivation of
the workforce, can be expected to adjust only slowly, implying state dependence of the
13productivity measure.
Finally, as already noted by Lallemand et al. (2004) there might be a simultaneity
problem between productivity, especially when measured as sales, and wage dispersion:
Consider a case where a ﬁrm experiences an unobserved productivity shock leading to
higher proﬁts. These in turn might inﬂuence intra-ﬁrm wage inequality through bonus
payments, ultimately leading to contemporaneous correlation between wage dispersion and
the error term from equation (1). This correlation in turn prevents identiﬁcation of the
causal impact of wage dispersion on productivity.
To address these three points equation (1) is estimated using the Arellano-Bond dy-
namic panel estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991).5 In a ﬁrst step the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects ηi are eliminated by applying a forward orthogonal deviations transformation (Arel-
lano and Bover 1995). Note that the usual within-transformation that subtracts the within-
subject average of a variable from its current realization leads to inconsistent estimates in
the presence of endogeneity because the transformed variable is related to all its current,
future and past realizations – including those endogenous. The forward orthogonal de-
viations transformation is similar to the usual within-transformation but uses only the
available future realizations of each variable for the transformation, thus leaving past re-
alizations as valid instruments.
In a second step the simultaneity problem is addressed by using second and third
lags of the right hand side variables as instruments. These are used alongside the strictly
exogenous variables (basically a series of time dummies) to form a set of moment conditions
that are used for GMM-estimation. As this yields more instruments than endogenous
regressors, the equation is overidentiﬁed and diﬀerence-in-Sargan-tests can be used to test
5Using Stata SE 9.2 this involves the user-written command xtabond2 (Roodman 2007), see Roodman
2006 for a description.
14for the exogeneity of instruments. These cannot reject the Null hypothesis of exogeneity
for almost all instruments with the lowest assorted p-values being 0.099 (Model I for size)
0.082 (Model II for size), 0.101 (Model III for size) and 0.062 (Model IV for collective
bargaining at the industry level). One should note at this point that the estimation results
indicate that size has only a minimal inﬂuence on productivity and collective bargaining
agreements on the branch level can only be marginally inﬂuenced by a speciﬁc ﬁrm which
should minimize potential problems with these instruments. Potentially harmful second-
order autocorrelation does not seem to be an issue as the Arellano-Bond-Test for (no)
autocorrelation (Arellano and Bond 1991) yields p-values of 0.309 (Model I), 0.542 (Model
II), 0.325 (Model III) and 0.286 (Model IV). For benchmark purposes we also report
estimates from standard within-estimators that assume strict exogeneity of all variables
conditional on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect ηi.
5 Results
Consider ﬁrst the results for the inequality measures. In the standard ﬁxed eﬀects esti-
mation we obtain signiﬁcant results for overall wage inequality that suggest a negative
(Model I) or U-shaped relationship (Model II) with ﬁrm returns. For average within group
inequality the point estimates also suggest a U-shaped relationship in models I and III
that is never signiﬁcant on any conventional level. These results are basically reversed if
we consider the (theoretically superior) Arellano-Bond-estimates: Here, we obtain point
estimates that suggest the same hump-shaped relationship found by Winter-Ebmer and
Zweimüller (1999) and Bingley and Eriksson (2001). Again, these results are not signiﬁ-
cant on any conventional level. For residual variation (Model IV) the results seem relatively
clear: Regardless of the speciﬁc estimation procedure, all coeﬃcients are close to zero and
15consequently insigniﬁcant.
(Table 3 about here.)
While the preceding discussion focused on statistical signiﬁcance, it is important to con-
sider the question whether the estimated eﬀects are also economically important, especially
when some point estimates suggest huge changes in the dependent variable. This consid-
eration is also important in the case of insigniﬁcant results where one has to distinguish
insigniﬁcance due to large standard errors, that is imprecise estimates, from insigniﬁcance
due to small coeﬃcients, that is economic irrelevance. To put the eﬀects into perspective,
we consider the change in returns caused by an increase by one (within ﬁrm) standard
deviation of the respective inequality measure.
In the case of overall wage inequality, an increase by 0.0688 causes only moderate
changes in log sales. In the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, sales drop by 0.016 (Model I) and 0.019
(Model II), while they increase by 0.024 (Model I) or remain practically unchanged (Model
II) when looking at the Arellano-Bond-results. Similar modest changes are obtained when
varying average group inequality. A rise by 0.0760 causes returns to drop by 0.003 (Model
I) and 0.008 (Model III) using the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates and to rise by 0.017 (Model I)and
0.028 (Model III) using the Arellano-Bond-estimates. As already noted above, the eﬀects
using residual variation are also very small, with a one standard deviation increase leading
to a rise in log returns of 0.002 (ﬁxed eﬀects) and 0.010 (Arellano-Bond). Taken together
this evidence suggests that wage inequality does not seem to play a particularly prominent
role in explaining diﬀerences in ﬁrm performance.
Now, looking at the parameters for the lagged dependent variable, we ﬁnd our initial
presumption that current productivity depends on its past values conﬁrmed. The esti-
16mated state dependence parameters are highly signiﬁcant in Models I, III and IV and
at least weakly signiﬁcant in Model II. Looking at the marginal eﬀects reveals that past
productivity explains between roughly 13% (Model II) and 22% (Model III) of current
productivity. Note that this may explain the relatively small impact of changes in wage
inequality: If ﬁrm performance depends strongly on its own past, we might expect it to
adjust only slowly to changes in the right hand side variables.
Finally taking a quick look at the control variables, one ﬁnds large diﬀerences between
the ﬁxed eﬀect and Arellano-Bond-results. Consider ﬁrst the results for collective bargain-
ing agreements. Here we obtain mixed results in our estimation: First, the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimates indicate a weak positive relationship between coverage by a collective bargaining
agreement and ﬁrm performance. Secondly, the Arellano-Bond-estimates show rather large
though mostly insigniﬁcant results. Note, however, that considerable care should be taken
in the interpretation of these results since they are identiﬁed by ﬁrms switching either into
or out of a collective bargaining agreement. Given the relative stability of industry level
collective bargaining agreements, the high degree of coverage of German industries by such
agreements and the rare occurrence of ﬁrm level agreements, these eﬀects are most likely
estimated using only a small subset of the ﬁrms in the sample and their importance should
consequently not be overstated.
Regarding the eﬀect of employment structure, one should note that ﬁrm size has a
negative but negligible impact on productivity over all models and estimation methods.
The impact of the share of qualiﬁed personal varies between estimation methods: Fixed
eﬀect results indicate a small, insigniﬁcant eﬀect while the Arellano-Bond results suggest a
positive relationship. The latter results are also economically important with a 10 percent-
age point increase in the share of qualiﬁed workers leading to a 3.5 to 4.5 percent increase
17in sales. A possible explanation for the observed diﬀerences between the ﬁxed eﬀects and
Arellano-Bond results might be the reactions of ﬁrms that experienced a negative shock in
sales and hired more qualiﬁed personal as a countermeasure thus leading to a simultaneity
problem in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. A similar argument could be found for the neg-
ative relationship between the share of women and ﬁrm performance in the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation: If women are less mobile than men and thus less likely to leave a ﬁrm that just
experienced a negative shock, we would expect to ﬁnd the same relationship as in table 3.
6 Conclusion
While the relationship between pay inequality and ﬁrm performance has received consid-
erable attention in theoretical economics, empirical relationships are still far from clear. In
particular, there has been few research combining inequality measures related to the whole
wage distribution in a ﬁrm with ﬁrm level panel data outside of special environments like
professional sports. This paper contributes to this literature by using linked employer-
employee-data from Germany. We construct several ﬁrm level inequality measures using
social security data and regress these on returns per head as a measure for productiv-
ity. Our estimation approach using dynamic panel estimators allows us to address issues
like unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity of wage inequality and performance as well as
possible dynamics in the adjustment process of ﬁrm performance to changes in the wages
structure.
Our results indicate a relatively small impact of wage inequality on ﬁrm performance.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the relationship between these variables tends to depend on the
estimation method used. While ﬁxed eﬀects estimators show a negative or U-shaped rela-
18tionship between some inequality measures and ﬁrm performance, results from Arellano-
Bond estimators indicate a hump-shaped relationship that is always insigniﬁcant. The
latter results also show that ﬁrm performance tends to exhibit a certain degree of state
dependence, indicating a delay in the adjustment process to changes in the right hand
side variables, which might explain the relatively small reaction to changes in the wage
structure.
Regarding the diﬀerent theories relating wage inequality and ﬁrm performance our re-
sults show relatively few support for either fairness or incentive based theories. If anything,
the results show some weak support for the idea that some inequality may be beneﬁcial,
while an increase beyond a certain point may harm performance.
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22Table 2: Descriptive statistics, estimation sample
Variable Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum
(overall) (within)
Sales per head (e, 2000 prices) 201,484.4 1,025,115 0 9.14∗107
Share of qualiﬁed workers .6329 .2547 .1178 0 1
Share of women .3096 .2592 .0543 0 1
Size (no. of employees) 279.2 793.61 75.75 2 20,957
Collective bargaining agreement industry level .6463 .4781 .2098 0 1
Collective bargaining agreement ﬁrm level .0749 .2632 .1553 0 1
Coeﬃcient of variation (overall) .4063 .1562 .0688 0 1.7878
Coeﬃcient of variation (average over subgroups) .2206 .1336 .0760 0 4.5616
Residual variation 19.47 6.70 3.65 .0764 214.88
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